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IN VACATION.

There is a Kentucky circuit judge who is a strong believer in his own infallibility. Not long ago a bank official was convicted in his court of a misappropriation of funds, after a trial in which many technical points had been raised. He was remanded for sentence until the end of the criminal calendar should have been reached. On the night before judgment the prisoner suddenly expired in his cell. The next morning the court officer informed his honor of the occurrence.

"You will never have to sentence Smith," said the officer. "He has gone to a Higher Court."

"I bet," replied the presiding judge, "that the case will be affirmed."

Trial lawyers are often perplexed at the itching of trial judges, who question witnesses at length instead of permitting the lawyers to do so. Many of these questions violate the rules of evidence, and many timorous lawyers lack the courage to object and except. It is related of Jeremiah Mason, the eminent lawyer, that when a judge in a certain case put a question to a witness which was of doubtful admissibility, he at once bluntly interfered with this remark: "If Your Honor puts that question for us, we don't want it; if you put it for the other side, then I object that it is not evidence." Such a rebuff, occasionally administered, will often command silence.—*Exchange*.

A New Hampshire judge has in his possession the following letter sent to him by an old farmer who had been notified that he had been drawn as a juror for a certain term of court:

"Deer Jedge, I got your letter tellin' me to come to manchesster an' do dooty on the joory an i rite you these fue lines to let you know that you'll have to git some one else for it ain't so that I kin leave home now. I got to do some butcherin' and sort over a lot of apples just about the time the joory will be settin' in your court. Si Jackman of this town says that he would as soon as not go, fer he ain't nothin' else to do jess now, so you better send for him. I hate the worst way not to oblidge you, but it ain't so I kin at present. Ennyhow I ain't much on the law, never havin' been a jooryman ceptin' when old Bud Stiles got killed by the cars here some years ago when I was one that set on the boddy with the koroner. So you better send fer Si Jackman, for he has got some kin in manchesster he wants to vissit anyhow, an' he'd be willin' to go fer his car fare there an back. Ancer back if you want Si."—*Exchange*.

The first sentence in the dissenting opinion of Steele, J., in *People v. District Court* (Col.), 68 Pac. 263, would seem to indicate that all is not harmony between him and his associates: "The Chief Justice having decided to concur in the opinion filed by Mr. Justice Gabbert, I deem it my duty to dissent from the judgment."